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Abstract
The increasing demand for building large-scale
complex and distributed systems such as Cloud/Grid
computing systems accentuates the need for complex
negotiation mechanisms for managing computing
resources. The contribution of this paper includes: 1)
summarizing classical negotiation problems and
conventional negotiation in terms of the utility
function, strategy, and protocol, 2) discussing the
differences between conventional negotiation and
unconventional negotiation, 3) reviewing and
comparing the state-of-the-art developments in both
relaxed-criteria negotiation, and complex and
concurrent negotiation, and 4) suggesting new
directions in complex negotiation and its
applications.

Introduction
Negotiation denotes the process of two or more
agents (with disparate interests) searching for an
agreement on some issues (e.g., price) [1]. The
search process involves exchange of information,
relaxation of initial goals, and mutual concessions.
Automated negotiation among distributed systems
(e.g., multi-agent systems and software agents) is
becoming increasingly important because automated
interactions among software agents can occur in
many different contexts in which conflicts and
differences need to be resolved. For instance,
e-negotiation is a desirable mechanism for resolving
differences in trading terms in e-commerce and
supply chain management, and more recently for
resource (co-)allocation in Grid computing. Research
on engineering e-negotiation agents has received a
great deal of attention in recent years.
The contribution of this paper includes: 1)
summarizing classical negotiation problems, and
conventional negotiation in terms of the utility
function, strategy and protocol, 2) reviewing and
comparing the state-of-the-art developments in
unconventional negotiation such as relaxed-criteria
negotiation, and complex and concurrent negotiation,
3) discussing the differences between conventional
negotiation and unconventional negotiation, and 4)
suggesting new directions in concurrent negotiation
and relaxed-criteria negotiation, and their
applications.

Conventional Negotiation

In the literature in bargaining (negotiation), the
seminal works of Nash [2], and Rubinstein and
Osborne [3-4] established the essential frameworks
and foundations of bargaining theory.
Bargaining Problem: In [3], a bargaining problem
is specified as follows. There is a set of N bargainers
(players or agents). The negotiation outcomes are: 1)
agents reaching an agreement or 2) negotiation
terminating with a conflict D. Each agent has a
negotiation set or agreement set A (see [3, p. 9]),
which represents the space of its possible deals or
proposals for reaching agreements with its opponent,
and the agent has a preference ordering over the set
A∪D. There is a utility function U for each agent that
represents its preference ordering by associating each
negotiation outcome with a number, such that more
preferred outcomes are associated with larger
numbers.
Utility function: An agreement may take many
forms. It can be a price or a detailed contract that
specifies the actions to be taken by agents [3]. In
classical bargaining problems involving price-only
negotiation between two agents B and S [3], the
utility function UB of B is defined as follows. Let IPB
and RPB be the initial and reserve prices of B. Let D
be the event in which B fails to reach an agreement
with its opponent. UB:[IPB,RPB] ∪D→[0,1] such that
UB(D)=0 and for any lB∈[IPB,RPB],UB(lB)>UB(D).
Furthermore, if B is a buyer (consumer) agent, then
U B (lB1 ) > U B (lB2 ) if lB1 < lB2 . If S is a seller
(provider) agent, then U S (lS1 ) < U S (lS2 ) if lS1 < lS2
such that for any lS∈[IPS,RPS], US(lS)>US(D).
Negotiation strategy: If B and its opponent S are
sensitive to time, then let τ B be the deadline of B, and

τ S , IPS and

RPS be the deadline, initial price, and

reserve price of S. In a one-to-one negotiation, the
only factor affecting both agents is their deadline. In
[5-7], B and S adopt time-dependent strategies. Let
λB and λS be the time-dependent strategies of B and S,
respectively. The proposal

Pt B of B at time

t , 0 ≤ t ≤ τ B , is determined as follows:
t
(4)
Pt B = IPB + ( )λ ( RPB − IPB )
τB
where 0≤λB≤∞, and IPB and RPB are B’s initial price
and reserve price, respectively.
B
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Pt S of S at time t , 0 ≤ t ≤ τ S is

The proposal

determined as follows:
t λ
(5)
) ( IPS − RPS )
τS
where 0≤λS≤∞, IPS and RPS are S’s initial price and
reserve price, respectively.
Negotiation protocol: Negotiation between B and
S is carried out using the Rubinstein’s
alternating-offers protocol [4] as follows. B makes
an offer at t = 0, 2, 4, 6, … S makes a counter offer at
t = 1, 3, 5, 7, … During negotiation, B (respectively,
S) uses eq. (4) (respectively, eq. (5)) to generate an
offer (respectively, a counter-offer). Negotiation
terminates (i) when an agreement is reached, or (ii)
with a conflict when either B’s or S’s deadline is
reached.
Optimizing utility: The problem is to find a value
of λB (respectively, λS) that would optimize UB
(respectively, US) given different parameters (e.g.,
deadline, initial price, and reserve price).
Pt S = IPS − (

S

Conventional Negotiation vs.
Unconventional Negotiation
In this paper, conventional negotiation [1-8]
approaches are identified with the following
characteristics:
1. An agreement is reached when one agent
proposes a deal that matches (or exceeds)
what another agent asks for.
2. Agents focus only on optimizing utilities.
3. When contracts are established, agents are
bound to them (i.e., no agent can breach a
contract).
4. Agents negotiate with other agent(s) for one
type of goods/service in only one market.
Agreements and utilities: In conventional
negotiation, agents evaluate (counter-)proposals
using some utility function U(P) and typically accept
a proposal P based on whether the opponent's
proposal generates an expected payoff that is equal to
or higher than some expected payoff. For example, if
agent B1’s proposal P1B generates a payoff of U(P1B),
B1 will typically accept another agent S1’s
(counter-)proposal P1S only if it generates a payoff
U(P1S), such that U(P1S)≥U(P1B). Since agents in
conventional
negotiation
mechanisms
are
utility-maximizing agents, they are not designed with
the flexibility to consider reaching a faster agreement
by accepting P1S if U(P1S)<U(P1B) even if the
difference
|U(P1S)-U(P1B)| is (very) small. In
multi-lateral negotiation, an agent may run the risk of
losing deals in the face of strong competition. The
idea of relaxed-criteria negotiation proposed by Sim
[9] redefines the notion of reaching a consensus in
negotiation by allowing agents to overlook very
small differences in their proposals, and hence,

slightly relaxing the conditions for reaching
agreements. Unlike conventional negotiation where
agents only strive to optimize their utilities, in
relaxed-criteria negotiation, agents attempt to
enhance their success rates in negotiation and to
reach faster agreements while also attempting to
optimize their utilities.
Contracts: In conventional negotiation, an agent is
bound to a contract once it is established (i.e., neither
party can breach the contract). In unconventional
negotiation, Sandholm et al. [10] proposed the idea
of leveled commitment contracts for a two-player
game, where each player can be freed from a contract
by paying a penalty fee to the other player, and the
level of commitment is set by breach penalties.
Allowing decommitments enables an agent to
profitably accommodate new negotiation events that
make some old contracts unbeneficial. This enables
an agent to take on unbeneficial contracts in
anticipation of better contracts in subsequent
negotiations.
For example, in Grid resource
negotiation, the reasons for allowing decommitments
are as follows: 1) if a consumer cannot acquire ALL
its required resources before its deadline, it can
release those resources acquired so that resource
providers can assign them to other consumers, and 2)
decommitment allows an agent that has already
reached an intermediate contract for a resource to
continue to search for better deals before the
termination of the entire concurrent negotiation.
Markets: In conventional negotiation, regardless of
the number of agents (participants), (i.e., whether it
is a one-to-one, one-to-many, or many-to-many
negotiations), agents negotiate for only one type of
goods/service within one market. A recent work by
Sim et al. [11] considered a complex concurrent
negotiation mechanism in which an agent conducts
simultaneous and parallel negotiation activities with
agents in multiple e-markets for acquiring multiple
types of resources.

Relaxed-criteria Negotiation
In Sim’s relaxed-criteria negotiation [9], two rules
were defined for allowing agents to reach
agreements:
R1: An agreement is reached if an agent B1 and its
opponent S1 propose deals P1B and P1S, respectively,
such that either 1) U(P1B)≥U(P1S) or 2)
U(P1S)≥U(P1B), where P1B and P1S represent the
buying and selling prices, respectively.
R2: An agreement is reached if either 1) η=
U(P1S)–U(P1B), such that η→0 or 2) η=
U(P1B)–U(P1S), such that η→0, where η is the
amount of relaxation determined using a fuzzy
decision controller (FDC) together with a set of
relaxation criteria.
In conventional negotiation, agents follow
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Rubinstein’s alternating-offers protocol and only use
R1 for determining whether an agreement is reached.
In Sim’s relaxed-criteria negotiation protocol, agents
use both R1 and R2 for determining whether an
agreement is reached.
Sim’s relaxed-criteria negotiation is generally
designed for many-to-many negotiation, and agents
are programmed to slightly relax their bargaining
terms in the face of intense pressure (e.g., urgent
need to acquire a resource, or facing fast approaching
deadlines). Since notions such as “very slight”
difference in proposals, “strong” competition, and
“fast” approaching deadline are vague, an FDC
together with a set of 16 fuzzy rules were used in [9]
to guide agents in making decisions when relaxing
their aspirations. In relaxing its bargaining terms, an
agent in [9] is influenced by factors such as degree of
competition ( ϑ ) and its eagerness (ε). ε represents
how urgent it is for an agent to acquire a resource
before a deadline [9]. An agent that is more
(respectively, less) eager to reach a consensus will be
more likely to overlook small differences between its
proposal and its opponents’ counter-proposals. Both
ϑ and ε are the relaxation criteria and they form the
antecedents of the fuzzy rules. The amount of
relaxation η is the consequent of a fuzzy rule.
Whereas ϑ and ε are the inputs to the FDC, η
represents the amount that an agent would relax its
bargaining terms in a given situation (the output of
the FDC).
In [12], the idea of relaxed-criteria negotiation was
generalized by augmenting the designs of negotiation
agents with additional fuzzy controllers to allow even
more flexibility in negotiation. In [12], agents can
both 1) raise their expectations in extremely
favorable markets and 2) lower expectations in
extremely unfavorable markets (i.e., relaxing their
bargaining criteria). In relaxing their bargaining
criteria, agents in [12] use the same set of relaxation
criteria (degree of competition and eagerness) as
agents in [9]. In raising their expectations, agents
face two challenging decisions: 1) whether to
postpone reaching consensus and 2) duration to
postpone deal. In very favorable market conditions,
an agent B1 may receive (>1) proposals O={ P1S,…,
P1S} from its opponents S1,…,Sk that are better than
or equal to its own proposal P1B, such that
U(PjS)≥U(P1B), ∀PjS∈O. Hence, B1 may postpone its
decision to reach a consensus with an opponent in the
hope that it can achieve a higher utility than U(P1B).
However, in multi-lateral negotiation, if B1 postpones
its decision to reach a consensus, it also runs the risk
of not completing the deal with any of its opponents
eventually. Hence, B1’s decision to postpone a deal
depends on the number of agents Na with a proposal
that is better than or equal to its own proposal. If Na
is a sufficiently large number, then it would be
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advantageous for B1 to postpone its deal. However,
B1 needs to determine how large Na should be for a
given market condition. For different market
situations, Na is determined by the degree of
competition ( ϑ ) that B1 faces and its eagerness (ε) to
acquire a resource/service. If B1 is very eager to
acquire an urgently needed resource or faces very
strong competition, it may not postpone the deal if Na
is not much larger than 1. Both ϑ and ε collectively
form the antecedent of the fuzzy rules of an FDC
(called FDC1 in [12]) for determining Na. If B1
decides to postpone its decision to reach a deal, it has
to decide the duration Tp for postponing the deal.
Two factors that affect Tp are the fraction of
remaining trading time Tr=(τ-t)/τ (where τ is the
deadline and t is the current round) and Na. Both Na
and Tr collectively form the antecedent of the fuzzy
rules of an FDC (called FDC2 in [12]) for
determining Tp.
Whereas slightly lowering expectation may
increase the probability of reaching consensus in
adverse market conditions, slightly raising
expectation may enhance the utilities of agents in
extremely good (albeit, rare) market situations.
Stochastic simulations in [12] demonstrated that
agents in [12] following the generalized
relaxed-criteria negotiation protocol achieved 1)
higher average utilities than agents in [9] following
the relaxed-criteria protocol and 2) higher success
rates
than
agents
in
[13-14]
following
alternating-offers protocol (i.e., agents that do not
relax their bargaining terms nor raise their
expectations).
Subsequently, the work in [9] was adapted to
automated negotiation in Grid resource management.
In Sim’s relaxed-criteria G-negotiation protocol
[15-16], agents representing resource providers and
consumers are programmed to slightly relax their
bargaining criteria under intense pressure (e.g., when
a consumer has a higher demand for resources) with
the hope of enhancing their chance of successfully
acquiring resources. A consumer agent and a
provider agent are both designed with an FDC:
FDC-C and FDC-P, respectively. Two different sets
of relaxation criteria (for consumers and providers,
respectively) that are specific to Grid resource
management are used as inputs to FDC-C and
FDC-P, respectively.
Two criteria that can influence a consumer agent’s
decision in the amount of relaxation of bargaining
terms are: 1) recent statistics in failing/succeeding in
acquiring resources called failure to success ratio (fst)
and 2) demand for computing resources called
demand factor (dft). If a consumer agent is less
successful in acquiring resources recently to execute
its set of tasks, it will be under more pressure to
slightly relax its bargaining criteria with the hope of
completing a deal. If a consumer agent has a greater
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demand for computing resources it is more likely to
be under more pressure to slightly relax its
bargaining criteria. Both fst and dft are inputs to
FDC-C, and the output is η (the amount of relaxation)
[15-16].
Two criteria that can influence a provider agent’s
decision are: 1) the amount of the provider’s
resource(s) being utilized (the utilization level (ult))
and 2) recent resource requests from consumers (the
request factor (rft)). If more of its resources are
currently being utilized or are occupied, then a
provider is less likely to slightly relax its bargaining
terms. If there are fewer recent demands from
consumers for resources, a provider is more likely to
slightly relax its bargaining criteria since it is under
more pressure to lease out its idle resources. Both ult
and rft are inputs to FDC-P, and the output is η
[15-16].
The fuzzy rules for FDC-C and FDC-P in
[15-16] and the FDC in [9] were manually generated,
and agents in [9] and [15-16] negotiate in only one
market. In [17], relaxed-criteria negotiation agents
were designed to negotiate in more than one
e-market and with the capability to continuously
enhance their performance by evolving their fuzzy
rules as they negotiate in more e-markets. Like
agents in [9, 15-16], agents in [17] also follow Sim’s
relaxed-criteria negotiation protocol. Whereas there
are two inputs to FDC-C and FDC-P in [15-16] and
the FDC in [9], there are three inputs to the FDC in
[17]. The three inputs corresponding to the set of
relaxation-criteria are: 1) time pressure, 2) degree of
competition, and 3) the relative distances from the
opponents’ proposals. When an agent’s deadline is
fast approaching, an agent is under more (time)
pressure to relax its bargaining criteria. Hence, at the
start of negotiation, an agent is less likely to overlook
small differences in proposals. Like agents in [9], an
agent in [17] that faces more (respectively, less)
competition is more (respectively, less) likely to
relax its bargaining criteria to reach an agreement.
Another criterion for relaxation is the relative
distances between the proposal of an agent and all
the proposals of its opponents. The general idea is
that if the best proposal from an agent’s opponent is
very close to its own proposal relative to all other
proposals from all other opponents, then it seems
prudent that an agent should relax its bargaining
terms and reach a consensus with the opponent with
the best proposal. The impetus of the work in [17] is
using an evolutionary procedure for learning
effective relaxed-criteria negotiation rules that will
enhance the performance of agents in terms of
negotiation success rates, utility, and negotiation
speed. Using the negotiation outcomes (success rates,
utility, and negotiation speed) of agents in each
e-market as data sets, at the termination of the
negotiation process for each e-market, a GA is

executed to evolve a new set of fuzzy relaxed-criteria
rules of agents. The new and enhanced set of fuzzy
rules will be adopted to guide agents in relaxing
bargaining terms when it negotiates in a new
e-market, and this process continues as agents
improve their performance as they negotiate in new
and different e-markets. This self-improving
characteristic represents the latest state of
development in relaxed-criteria negotiation.

Concurrent and Complex Negotiation
This section reviews complex negotiation in which
agents conduct concurrent and simultaneous
negotiation activities, and can potentially be freed
from intermediate contracts by paying penalty fees.
Rahwan et al.’s [18] one-to-many negotiation
model consists of one buyer and multiple sellers, and
the buyer has a number of sub-negotiators. There are
multiple negotiation threads, and in each negotiation
thread, each different sub-negotiator conducts a
one-to-one negotiation with a different seller. Four
strategies were proposed in [18] for controlling and
coordinating multiple simultaneous one-to-one
negotiations: 1) Desperate Coordination Strategy
(DCS), 2) Patient Coordination Strategy (PCS), 3)
Optimized Patient Coordination Strategy (OPCS),
and 4) Strategy Manipulation Coordination Strategy
(SMCS). In DCS, the coordinator agent terminates all
negotiations once any negotiation thread reaches an
agreement. In PCS, the coordinator agent waits until
all sub-negotiators have completed negotiation, then
chooses the best offer. In OPCS, the coordinator uses
the negotiation outcome from a negotiation thread to
influence the performance of other negotiation
threads. For example (see [18, p. 201]), if one
sub-negotiation found a deal with utility 7, then in
other negotiation threads, any offers with utility
lower than 7 will be considered unacceptable. In
SMCS, the coordinator may modify the negotiation
strategies of different negotiation threads at runtime.
For instance, if a deal has been secured in one
negotiation thread, the consumer can adopt a
“take-it-or-leave-it” strategy in other negotiation
threads [18, p. 201].
Ngyuen et al. [19] also proposed a one-to-many
negotiation model consisting of multiple concurrent
one-to-one negotiations. Unlike agents in [18],
agents in [19] adopt the time-dependent
concession-making strategies in [7]: 1) Conceder
(quickly conceding to its reservation value), 2) linear
strategy conceding to its reservation value, and 3)
Bouleware (maintaining its value until the deadline is
almost reached, then rapidly conceding to its
reservation value). [19] introduced more flexibility to
their concurrent one-to-one negotiation model by
allowing buyer and seller agents to renege on deals
(i.e., decommit deals) at the expense of paying
penalty fees. Whereas [10] proposed leveled
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commitment contracts for a two-player game, [19]
extended the work in [10] to concurrent negotiation
involving one buyer and many sellers, and included
two additional features: 1) reasoning about when to
decommit from a contract and 2) determining
whether a new contract is acceptable by considering
decommitment thresholds. In [19], the penalty fee is
dynamically computed as a percentage of the utility
of the deal and the time when the contract is broken.
A new contract is acceptable if the utility gained by
taking the new contract is greater than that of the
current contract after paying the penalty fee for
decommitment, and the degree of acceptance is
above a predefined threshold θ that specifies the
extent that a buyer agent should accept proposals. A
buyer agent in [19] adopts either of the two
commitment management strategies: greedy (θ=0)
(tends to accept any possible deal) or patient (θ = 0.5)
(only deals that provide a certain expected utility
value will be accepted). Additionally, there are two
types of provider agents in [19]: loyal providers that
will never renege on contracts and partial providers
that will possibly renege on contracts.
Sim et al. [11] proposed a concurrent negotiation
model consisting of multiple one-to-many
negotiations. Designed for bolstering Grid resource
co-allocation, the concurrent negotiation model
consists of a coordinator which coordinates the
parallel negotiation activities for acquiring n
different types of Grid resources in n different
resource markets. In each resource market, a
consumer agent negotiates simultaneously with
multiple resource provider agents for one type of
Grid resource. Furthermore, both consumer and
provider agents can be freed from a contract by
paying penalty fees to their opponents. In negotiating
for one type of Grid resource in a resource market,
there is a commitment manager that manages both
commitments and decommitments of (intermediate)
contracts. In [11], three classes of commitment
management strategies (CMSs): {Linear-CMS,
Conciliatory-CMS, and Conservative-CMS} were
defined by combining the commitment management
steps with the time-dependent concession making
functions in [6]: 1) conservative (maintaining the
initial price until an agent’s deadline is almost
reached), 2) conciliatory (conceding rapidly to the
reserve price), and 3) linear (conceding linearly). In
[20], Sim et al. adopted an Adaptive-CMS in which
the commitment management steps were combined
with an adaptive concession making strategy. An
agent’s adaptive concession making strategy in [20]
is derived from its current bargaining position in a
resource market. For instance, a consumer agent is in
an advantageous (respectively, a disadvantageous)
bargaining position if it is negotiating in a resource
market with more (respectively, fewer) provider
agents. The coordinator can coordinate the parallel
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negotiation activities in n resource markets using: 1)
the Utility-oriented Coordination Strategy (UOCS)
and 2) the Patient Coordination Strategy (PCS). In
the UOCS, at each negotiation round, the coordinator
determines whether to terminate the entire concurrent
negotiation based on the predicted utility changes
received from every commitment manager for each
one-to-many negotiation. In the PCS, the coordinator
terminates all concurrent negotiations when it
acquires all required resources without considering
time constraint. In [20], the prediction in the change
of utilities in the UOCS was enhanced using linear
regression (the Regression-based Utility-oriented
Coordination Strategy (RUOCS)). Favorable
empirical results in [20] show that agents adopting
the RUOCS achieved the highest final utilities among
the three coordination strategies (RUOCS, UOCS,
and PCS).

Conclusion and New Directions
This paper has discussed the differences between
conventional negotiation and unconventional
negotiation and summarized the state-of-the-art
developments in both relaxed-criteria negotiation,
and complex and concurrent negotiation.
Whereas game-theoretic research [2-4] provides
solution concepts for optimizing agents’ utilities in
simpler negotiation settings (e.g., one-to-one
negotiation), relaxed-criteria negotiation offers a
novel approach in solving much more complex
negotiation problems using heuristics to improve
success rates and negotiation speed. Whereas
researchers in game theory [2-4] provided solution
concepts for determining equilibrium strategies for
negotiation, they did not provide techniques for
computing and finding these equilibrium strategies,
and [21] has shown that finding the equilibrium
strategies is NP-hard even in a simple one-to-one
negotiation setting. Through empirical studies,
relaxed-criteria negotiation aims at providing an
alternative means for studying the behaviors of
negotiation agents in complex environments.
In conventional negotiation, participants negotiate
in the same market (i.e., within one market). In
concurrent negotiation, a participant conducts
simultaneous and parallel negotiation activities with
resource providers in multiple e-markets to acquire
multiple types of resources. Furthermore, in complex
negotiation, both buyers and sellers can renege on
(intermediate) contracts by paying penalty fees. In
conventional negotiation, agents negotiate only in
one e-market for one product/service, and the
attributes that may complicate the design of
negotiation mechanisms include: 1) the number of
negotiation participants and 2) the number of issues
involved in negotiation. In complex negotiation
involving decommitments and parallel negotiation
activities in multiple e-markets, there are two
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additional attributes that contribute to the complexity
in concurrent negotiation: 1) the number of e-markets
that an agent is involved in and 2) the number of
times that contracts are breached before negotiation
terminates.
New direction: The increasing demand for
building large-scale complex and distributed systems
such as Cloud/Grid computing systems accentuates
the need for complex negotiation mechanisms for
managing computing resources. Supporting resource
co-allocation is essential for Grid computing because
1) computationally intensive applications often
require more resources than a single computing
machine can provide, and 2) an application may
require multiple types of computing capabilities from
different resource owners [22]. Successfully
obtaining contracts from multiple resource owners
for simultaneously accessing several resources is a
very challenging task given that stakeholders often
have different requirements. Allocating multiple
resources in a coordinated fashion across virtual
organizational boundaries is also a very difficult
problem (e.g., mapping application workflows
consisting of interacting components that need to be
executed in a certain partial order to Grid resources is
an NP complete problem [23]). One way of solving
such a hard problem is to use heuristic approaches
(e.g., relaxed-criteria negotiation). This paper
suggests that a relaxed-criteria concurrent negotiation
mechanism may be an appropriate tool for
facilitating Grid resource co-allocation. In a
relaxed-criteria concurrent negotiation mechanism,
1) agents in a Grid resource market follow a
relaxed-criteria negotiation protocol, and perhaps
adopt a set of criteria in [15-16] (i.e., failure to
success ratio, demand factor, utilization level, and
request factor), for relaxing bargaining terms, and 2)
coordination of the parallel negotiation activities may
be achieved by adopting one of the three
coordination strategies in [11, 20] (RUOCS, UOCS,
and PCS).
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